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LEGAL MODERNISM 
David Lu ban* 
What are the roots of Critical Legal Studies? "The immediate in-
tellectual background . . . is the . . . achievement of early twentieth 
century modernism ... ,"1 writes Roberto Unger in his CLS mani-
festo; he elaborates this modernist connection in his deep and subtle 
book Passion. 2 Other CLS members also draw parallels between their 
endeavor and artistic modernism. J 
Obviously, CLS is first and foremost a movement of left-leaning 
legal scholars; it is also associated with distinctive theoretical claims 
about law. But it should be equally obvious that CLS involves sensi-
bilities and affinities that are strikingly similar to those of an artistic 
avant-garde. Moreover, CLS lives in a complicated relationship to its 
past and to its institutional setting - it simultaneously rejects and 
builds upon mainstream legal theory, simultaneously reviles and de-
pends upon the legal academy. These ambivalences are strikingly sim-
ilar to the relationships of artistic modernists to premodern art (on the 
one hand) and to the commercial art world (on the other). 
Social facts like these are never merely superficial; thus, they pro-
vide ample reason to consider carefully CLS' connection with artistic 
modernism. That is my purpose in this essay. The thesis that I want 
to explore here is roughly this: CLS is to legal theory as modernist art 
was to traditional art. CLS is legal modernism. 
* Associate Professor, University of Maryland School of Law; Research Associate, Univer-
sity of Maryland Center for Philosophy and Public Policy. B.A. 1970, University of Chicago; 
Ph.D. 1974, Yale University. - Ed. 
This essay was originally prepared for the plenary session of the Canadian Association of 
Law Teachers, held in Winnipeg, May 29, 1986. I would like to thank the C.A.L.T. for its great 
hospitality and interest. I also wish to thank Alan Hornstein, Michael Kelly, Jerrold Levinson, 
Judith Lichtenberg, Sherry Manasse, Deborah Rhode, Girardeau Spann, Mark Tushnet, and 
Robin West for their very helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay. 
1. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 587 (1983); see also 
id. at 660-62. 
2. R.M. UNGER, PASSION: AN EssAY ON PERSONALITY (1984). 
3. The connection with modernism - which I have mostly heard in conversations with CLS 
members - was emphasized by Mark Tushnet in his addresss and comments at the 1986 AALS 
Jurisprudence Section meeting in Philadelphia. See also Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern 
Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 291 (1985), which develops the philosophical 
(rather than artistic) side of modernism, ending with a call for aesthetic commitment to the 
reconstruction of our social world. 
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I 
The thesis has great plausibility. Let me list five characteristics of 
modem art that CLS writing evidently shares. 
(1) It makes people angry. In 1907 Matisse visited Picasso in his 
studio to look at Picasso's latest painting, the epochal Demoiselles 
d'Avignon, the prototype of Cubism. Matisse thought it was a hoax, a 
spoof on the whole modem movement, and swore that he would "sink 
Picasso."4 Similarly, the premier of Stravinsky's Le Sacre du 
Printemps produced a riot (and one critic labeled the work Massacre 
du Printempss). 
(2) It leaves an important hunger unsatisfied. When Braque saw 
Demoiselles d'Avignon in 1908, he commented: "It is as though we 
were supposed to exchange our usual diet for one of tow and paraf-
fin."6 As Leo Steinberg describes it, "There is a sense of loss, of sud-
den exile, of something willfully denied - sometimes a feeling that 
one's accumulated culture or experience is hopelessly devalued, leav-
ing one exposed to spiritual destitution."7 
(3) It bursts into public surrounded by manifestos, polemics, criti-
cisms, labels, and words, words, words. The phenomenon need hardly 
be remarked upon; it was savagely lampooned by Tom Wolfe in The 
Painted Word, 8 a book whose title tells all. According to Wolfe, Pol-
lock exists only as an illustrator of Greenberg's theories, just as de 
Kooning illustrates Rosenberg's, and Johns illustrates Steinberg's. Ar-
tistic subject and critical predfoate have been reversed. More sympa-
thetically, Stanley Cavell writes: "Often one does not know whether 
interest is elicited and sustained primarily by the object or by what can 
be said about the object. My suggestion is not that this is bad, but that 
it is definitive of a modernist situation."9 
Nobody would disagree that these are three characteristics of mod-
ernism. The next two are more controversial. 
(4) The characteristic failing of modernist work, when it fails, is 
not that it is bm1. but that it is fraudulent. 10 by which I mean this: art is 
4. L. STEINBERG, Contemporary Art and the Plight of Its Public, in OTHER CRITERIA: CON-
FRONTATIONS WITH TWENTIETH-CENTURY ART 4 (1972). 
5. Stravinsky, however, gave as well as he got, describing Glazunov as "Carl Philipp Eman-
uel Rimsky-Korsakov." And Poulenc relates that no Parisian modernist dared listen to Vienna-
school music, because Stravinsky referred to Wozzeck as "une musique boche" and to Mahler as 
"Malheur." I. STRAVINSKY & R. CRAFT, RETROSPECTIVES AND CONCLUSIONS 193 (1969). 
6. L. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 6. 
7. Id. at 7. 
8. T. WOLFE, THE PAINTED WORD (1975). 
9. s. CAVELL, Music Discomposed, in MUST WE MEAN WHAT WE SAY? 207 (1969). 
10. Id. at 188-89. 
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always the working of a medium - objects, pigments, sounds, words 
- but not every working of a medium is art. To offer something as a 
work of art is to claim that the medium has in some way been transfig-
ured, that it is now more than objects, pigments, sounds, or words. If 
that claim is false, then the work is a fraud, for it holds itself out as art 
when it is not. Clement Greenberg described the sculpture of Anne 
Truitt as art that "flirt[s] with the look of non-art," 11 and this descrip-
tion holds to some extent, I think, for all modernism, at least when we 
first see it. Sometimes it crosses the line into non-art; and, since it 
nevertheless holds itself out as art, it is a fraud. As Cavell puts it: 
If you look at a Pollock drip painting or at a canvas consisting of eight 
parallel stripes of paint, and what you are looking for is composition 
(matters of balance, form, reference among the parts, etc.), the result is 
absurdly trivial: a child could do it; I could do it. The question, there-
fore, if it is art, must be: How is this to be seen? What is the painter 
doing? The problem, one could say, is not one of escaping inspiration, 
but of determining how a man could be inspired to do this, why he feels 
this necessary or satisfactory, how he can mean this. Suppose you con-
clude that he cannot. Then that will mean ... that you conclude that 
this is not art, and this man is not an artist; that in failing to mean what 
he's done, he is fraudulent. 12 
John Cage's 4'33" (the notorious silent "piano" piece) crosses the line 
into non-art, as (in my opinion) do Ad Reinhardt's all-over-black 
paintings and Duchamp's urinal. Aleatoric music, and some Pop Art, 
are fraudulent. 
I do not mean to imply that fraudulence is the only way modernist 
art can fail, that modernist art admits of no judgments of quality. Ob-
viously, dull or minor Cubist works were painted, unimaginative and 
tedious serial music was composed. My claim is only that the charge 
of fraudulence is the most characteristic accusation leveled against 
modernist works, especially at first. (And some modernist works, such 
as Duchamp's urinal, cannot conceivably be criticized in terms of qual-
ity rather than fraudulence.) 
Finally, most controversially: 
(5) The artist herself cannot know beyond a doubt that she is cre-
ating art, rather than non-art or fraudulent art. No matter how sure 
his own eye, Pollock could not know that his all-over drip paintings 
were paintings; nor could Schoenberg know that Pierrot Lunaire was 
music. That is because, by definition, a fraud can take you in; and the 
artist herself is no less gullible than her audience. The artist may sin-
11. Greenberg, Recentness of Sculpture, in MINIMAL ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 185 
(G. Ballcock ed. 1968). 
12. S. CAVELL, supra note 9, at 203. 
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cerely intend a piece to be art, but neither being an artist nor sincerely 
intending are sufficient to grant one more insight into what one's art 
has become than any other member of the community possesses. 
To put it another way, modernism throws into question the essence 
of the art, or rather, throws into question whether the art has an es-
sence, and opens up a number of directions in which the art can be 
reconstituted and recharacterized. Only if, in the bright light of the 
public and the fullness of time, the work sustains the level of convic-
tion that the art of the past sustained, will it prove to be an instance of 
its art (painting, music, legal theory) at all (by showing us something 
that, all along, the art was). 
My first suggestion, then, is that CLS is legal modernism because: 
it makes people angry, it leaves a hunger unsatisfied (e.g., for "serious" 
doctrinal analysis, or practicable alternative proposals), it thrives in an 
atmosphere of polemic and manifesto and auto-commentary, its char-
acteristic mode of failure is quackery rather than mediocrity, and the 
members of the CLS movement themselves don't know - I say: can't 
know - when they are worth taking seriously. 
II 
The five characteristics I have just listed constitute an external or 
symptomatic description of modernism - they concern the way mod-
ernist work is received, and the way it presents itself. More important 
(perhaps) is an internal description of modernism. This, of course, is a 
subject over which much ink has been spilled, and it will scarcely be 
possible to find a noncontroversial internal description of modernism. 
(Modernism is like Marxism in that deadlier enmities form within the 
movement over the question of what the movement is and what it 
means than over anything else, including how to deal with external 
threats.) 
I propose to distinguish two ways of characterizing modernism, 
one concerned with the content of modernist art, the other with its 
form. 
For the content, I rely on Unger. He lists writers whom he consid-
ers modernism's paradigms: Proust, Joyce, Woolf, Kraus, Beckett, 
Bely, Kafka, Musil, Celine, Eliot, and Montale, and (among philoso-
phers) Heidegger and Sartre;13 he describes their primary themes in 
three theses: 
(1) "[O]ur dealings with other individuals have primacy over the 
search for an impersonal reality or good. And among all encounters 
[modernists] ascribe special importance to those that put in question 
13. R.M. UNGER, supra note 2, at 33. 
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the relation between the requirements of self-assertion" (by which Un-
ger means: between the requirement to open ourselves to others and 
the requirement to protect ourselves from them).14 
(2) "[T]he conviction that the person transcends his contexts";15 
"the intolerance of all limits."16 
(3) "The modernists often combine an acknowledgment of the 
supreme importance of personal love with a skepticism about the pos-
sibility of achieving it or, more generally, of gaining access to another 
mind."17 
These theses stress the themes of homelessness (in the world, 
among other people, in one's roles) and isolation. I shall refer to this 
account of modernism's content as the "exile-motif" - the notion of 
exile encompasses isolation as well as homelessness. (So does the over-
worked word "alienation," but it has come to mean so many things 
that I shall not make it mean one more.) 
More important than the content-based account of modernism, 
however, is the theory of modernist form, in the wide sense that in-
cludes language (vocabulary) as well as organization (syntax). One is 
more likely to think of the formal experiments of Joyce and Kafka and 
Woolf - of stream-of-consciousness and difficult language and allu-
siveness and dreamlikeness and freeing-up of plotline - than of the 
exile-motif. In music one thinks of tone-rows and folk songs and dis-
sonance; in the visual arts, of abstraction and surrealism. 
In what follows, I shall be relying upon a theory of modernism 
developed by Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried (writing about 
the visual arts) and Stanley Cavell (writing about music). 18 Greenberg 
states the basic theory thus: 
I identify Modernism with the intensification, almost the exacerbation, 
of [the] self-critical tendency that began with the philosopher Kant. ... 
The essence of Modernism lies, as I see it, in the use of the character-
istic methods of a discipline to criticize the discipline itself - not in 
order to subvert it, but to entrench it more firmly in its area of 
competence .... 
. . . The arts could save themselves from ... leveling down only by 
demonstrating that the kind of experience they provided was valuable in 
its own right and not to be obtained from any other kind of activity. 
14. Id. at 35. 
15. Id. at 36. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 38. 
18. I do not mean to imply that Greenberg, Fried, and Cavell agree in their views. Fried 
states some important criticisms of Greenberg in Fried, How Modernism Works: A Response to 
T.J. Clark, in THE PoLmCS OF INTERPRETATION 221, 226-29 (y/.J.T. Mitchell ed. 1983). 
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... Each art had to determine, through the opel'.ations'peculiar to 
itself, the effects peculiar and exclusive to itself. 19 
Similarly, Cavell writes, "Whatever painting may be about, modernist 
painting is about painting, about what it means to use a limited two-
dimensional surface in ways establishing the coherence and interest we 
demand of art."20 
The Greenberg-Fried-Cavell approach to modernism is often 
termed "formalist." I think this is a misnomer, since the self-criticism 
of an art often manifests itself in a piece's content. The use of allusions 
to premodernist work, for example, is a typical modernist device: 
think of Manet's ironic allusion to Titian's sumptuous nude Venus of 
Urbino in his Olympia - a painting of a nude prostitute in the identi-
cal posture. This is surely not a formal device.21 In line with Green-
berg's initial characterization, I shall call the Greenberg-Fried-Cavell 
theory "neo-Kantian" rather than formalist. 22 
Let us see how the theory works by considering an example. A 
neo-Kantian account might explain the emergence of abstraction as a 
criticism, within painting, of the traditional conception of painting as 
pictorial - that is, of the idea that a necessary condition for the possi-
bility of an object's being a painting is that it represent something.23 
19. Greenberg, Modernist Painting, in THE NEW ART 67-68 (G. Battcock rev. ed. 1973). 
20. S. CAVELL, supra note 9, at 207; see also id. at 219-20 (for an elaboration in the direction 
of the Greenberg excerpt); Fried, Introduction to THREE AMERICAN PAINTERS (Fogg Art Mu-
seum 1965). 
21. Greenberg helped propagate the notion that his theory is "formalist." See Greenberg, 
Necessity of ''Formalism," 3 NEW LITERARY HIST. 171, 173-74 (1971). 
For discussion of Manet's use of allusion, see Fried, Manet's Sources: Aspects of his Art, 1859-
1865, ARTFORUM, Mar. 1969, at 28 [hereinafter cited as Fried, Manet's Sources]. The allusion to 
Titian's Venus is analyzed in T. REFF, MANET: OLYMPIA 54-61 (1976). An interesting recent 
discussion of Olympia is T.J. CLARK, THE PAINTING OF MODERN LIFE: PARIS IN THE ART OF 
MANET AND HIS FOLLOWERS 79-146 (1984). Fried and Clark consider their approaches to be 
competitors - see their debate: Clark, Clement Greenberg's Theory of Art, in THE PoLmcs OF 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 203; Clark, Arguments About Modernism: A Reply to 
Michael Fried, in THE PoLmcs OF INTERPRETATION, supra note 18, at 239; Fried, supra note 
18 - but neither of them need disagree with the other about whether the allusion to Titian is a 
nonfonnal self-criticism of art. 
22. Indeed, Greenberg's notion of modernism as the attempt to lay bare the necessary condi-
tions for the possibility of each separate art bears a distant resemblance to the philosophy of 
symbolic forms of the neo-Kantian philosopher Cassirer. See E. CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
SYMBOLIC FORMS (1953-57) (Vol. 1: LANGUAGE; Vol. 2: MYTHICAL THOUGHT; Vol. 3: THE 
PHENm.~ENOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE); E. CASSIRER, AN EssAY ON MAN (1944). 
23. Greenberg himself gives a more complex account, his famous "theory of flatness" nicely 
mocked by Wolfe: Old Master painting, representing depth on a fiat surface, dissembled about 
the essential flatness of the surface, making painting "sculptural." Modernist painting empha-
sizes the flatness of the canvas, and the abandonment of representation follows as a corollary of 
the abandonment of the third dimension. Greenberg, supra note 19, at 68-70; see also C. GREEN-
BERG, Abstract, Representational. and so forth; Modernist Sculpture, Its Pictorial Past; Byzantine 
Parallels; and On the Role of Nature in Modernist Painting, in ART AND CULTURE 133, 158, 167, 
171 (1961). 
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By abandoning representation, Kandinsky's Improvisations - the first 
abstract paintings - make us see that representation was merely a 
convention, a limitation. For the Improvisations are clearly paintings 
of the highest quality even though they are neither pictorial nor 
merely decorative. 
The Improvisations, in other words, contain the criticism of picto-
rial painting in them as if it were a subject matter. I must add one 
important qualification, however. The neo-Kantian theory of modern-
ism is a relatively conservative one, in two ways. First, the self-criti-
cism of an art is not simply a negation or rejection of it; it is a 
dialectical - though not a necessary - development of the art within 
the art. Modernist art is the determinate negation of premodernism. 
(The Improvisations appear to us now as a logical development and 
extension of the representational pictures Kandinsky and Gabriele 
Miinter were painting in Murnau after 1908. That the turn to abstrac-
tion, though logical, was not necessary is illustrated by the fact that 
Miinter never made the turn but nevertheless continued to deepen as 
an artist.) 
Second, neo-Kantian modernism still seeks to live up to the quality 
achieved by the great premodernist works. Though modernism is sus-
picious of the capacity of the premodernist tradition to sustain signifi-
cant art any longer, it is not suspicious of the significance of 
premodernist art. 
For, on the neo-Kantian theory, the self-criticism of an art cannot 
rest content merely with abandoning conventions. Abandoning a con-
vention is only half the demonstration that the art can get along with-
out it: the other half, of course, is that the modernist work convinces 
us that it is still an instance of the art. The abstract painting must 
provide us with aesthetic rewards comparable to (though different 
from) a traditionalist painting. There will remain, I have said, some 
aesthetic hunger that the abstract painting does not satisfy; but as it 
works on us over time - and it had better not take too much time -
it creates and fulfills new modes of aesthetic wanting. Otherwise it has 
failed- not just as a painting, but as painting. Thus the neo-Kantian 
account continues to respect the art's tradition. 
III 
There is a connection between the neo-Kantian account of mod-
ernist form and Unger's insistence that the exile-motif is its content. 
The abstract artist does not criticize representational painting merely 
because it involves a mistaken thesis about what paintings are (i.e., 
1664 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1656 
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MANET, THE OLD MUSICIAN 
necessarily pictorial). She confronts representational painting with the 
much stronger charge that it lies about the world. It lies by using the 
illusionist techniques that since Brunelleschi have been its chief point 
of pride, in order· to pretend that it is not painting, i.e., not just "flat-
ness and the deliyritation of fiatness."24 "Realistic, illusionist art had 
dissembled the medium, using art to conceal art. Modernism used art 
to call attention to art."25 Pictorial painting is not a mistake, it is a lie. 
24. Greenberg, After Abstract Expressionism, ART INTL., Oct. 25, 1962, at 24, 30. I believe 
Greenberg's "theory of flatness" is directed primarily at Bernard Berenson's claim, in his cele· 
brated 1896 essay The Florentine Painters, that the aesthetic worth of painting resides primarily 
in its representation of "tactile values." B. BERENSON, ITALIAN PAINTERS OF THE RENAIS· 
SANCE 40-43 (1957). This illustrates how modernism amounts to an internal, or dialectical, criti-
cism of traditional painting: Greenberg agrees with Berenson that the great achievement of 
Florentine painting lay in the representation of "tactile values"; his disagreement is over Beren· 
son's value judgment, which Greenberg takes to be an endorsement of deception. 
25. Greenberg, supra note 19, at 68. Brunelleschi had demonstrated his invention of linear 
perspective in a remarkable way, which illustrates what the modernist is complaining about. He 
painted the Florentine Baptistery mirror-reversed on a board, drilled a hole in the board, placed 
burnished silver on top of the painting (to reflect sky and moving clouds), and placed the whole 
contrivance directly in front of the Baptistery itself, facing the Baptistery. The beholder would 
first look at the Baptistery, and'then look through the hole in the back of the painting, holding a 
mirror to the painting. In the mirror, he would see the Baptistery itself; the perfection of the 
August 1986] Legal Modernism 1665 
More than that: it is not just a lie about what a painting is, but 
also about what the painting's beholder is, about the ontological rela-
tionship between painting and beholder.26 The illusionist picture pre-
tends to be a window into the scene depicted, a scene which goes on 
oblivious of the beholder. A traditionalist takes this pretense to be a · 
mark of quality in the painting. Thus, Diderot wrote in praise of Van 
Dyck: 
If, when one paints a picture, one supposes there to be spectators, all is 
lost. The painter steps out of his canvas, like an actor who talks to the 
gallery steps out of his scene. It is in pretending that there is no one in 
the world except the personages in the picture that Van Dyck is 
sublime. 27 · 
But to the modernist, this pretense is morally unacceptable. The 
representational painter turns the beholder into a voyeur. By falsifying 
the nature of the painting, the voyeur/beholder is able to forget her-
self, her predicament (a beholder confronting flatness and the delimi-
tation of flatness).2s 
To see what acknowledging the beholder means, one might look at 
Manet's Old Musician in the National Gallery of Art in Washington. 
Manet is often taken to be the first modernist, and this incredible mas-
terwork plainly acknowledges the relation between painting and be-
holder in a novel way. The tableau includes a strange assortment of 
characters who, though paired, are in a state of frozen isolation from, 
and indifference toward, each other. The shallow space, the abstract 
color-field landscape, and the lack of modeling - the Old Musician's 
face alone is strongly modeled - all call attention to the flatness of the 
canvas in just the way the neo-Kantians emphasize. Similarly, the arti-
ficial bisection of the right-hand figure by the edge makes us aware of 
the canvas as bounded. Moreover, Manet gives the space what depth 
it has in the most perfunctory of ways. Take away the stage-props -
illusion was the proof of perspective. See s. EDGERTON, THE RENAISSANCE REDISCOVERY OF 
LINEAR PERSPECTIVE 124-52 (1975) (an account by Manetti, a contemporary of Brunelleschi, is 
quoted at 127-29). I am indebted to Michael Sukale for allowing me to read an English version 
of Sukale, Brunelleschi's V°ISual Demonstration, 92 IYYUN 129 (1980). 
26. This way of framing the issue comes from Fried, particularly Fried, Art and Objecthood, 
in MINIMAL ART: A CRITICAL ANTHOLOGY 116 (G. Battcock ed. 1968); M. FRIED, ABSORP-
TION AND THEATRICALITY: PAINTING AND BEHOLDER IN THE iA.GE OF DIDEROT (1980). 
27. "Si quand on fait un tableau, on suppose des spectateurs, tout est perdu. Le peintre sort 
de sa toile, comme l'acteur qui parle au parterre sort de la scene. En supposant qu'il n'y a 
personne au monde que les personnages du tableau, celui de Vandick est sublime." Quoted in M. 
FRIED, ABSORPTION AND THEATRICALITY, supra note 26, at 149. 
28. Obviously, such a sweeping account of representational painting must be false in the 
details. For a compelling argument that seventeenth-century Dutch painting differed from Ital-
ian painting in its representational assumptions, see S. ALPERS, THE ART OF DESCRIBING 
(1983). 
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the tree branch, the shadows in the foreground, and the Old Musi-
cian's knapsack - and the figures will flatten and pop out like a chain 
of paper dolls. These are Manet's formal devices. 
The depicted characters are figures from - that is, allusions to -
paintings by Velasquez, Watteau, LeNain, and Manet himself.29 Art 
is thus the content of this painting (the Old Musician is, of course, an 
artist). The problematic, mediated character of our relation to the de-
picted scene is emphasized by the inscrutability of the figures. The 
boy next to the Old Musician and the two right-hand figures in partic-
ular appear to have been captured as it were "between poses,'' as in a 
snapshot taken a second too late. The scene thus has no narrative 
unity, and the only thing that holds it together is the seated figure of 
the Old Musician himself, gazing out at us, meeting our gaze, inviting 
us to make what we can of the painting, acknowledging our presence 
as nothing in painting ever had before. Manet seems explicitly to pose 
the painting-beholder relationship as the solution to a riddle, leaving 
us to guess what the riddle itself is. 30 Encountering the figure of the 
Old Musician is like encountering a demiurge who causes us to under-
stand that it is only the painter's art that sustains the painting -
causes us to understand that we are seeing only a painting. And that 
is what makes it modernist. 
Such modernist preoccupations lend themselves especially well to 
incorporating the exile-motif, which appears with astonishing literal-
ness in The Old Musician. Seven silent, unsmiling figures looking in 
seven different directions, past rather than at each other: what could 
more strongly evoke human isolation? They are, moreover, a band of 
vagabonds on the road. The clothing of the two right-hand figures con-
veys a sense of formerly comfortable living fallen on hard times; the 
(motherless?) infant is cared for by a waif. We see this troupe as a 
band of refugees, as displaced persons;31 and that is how Manet paints 
modernist homelessness. 
At the same time, The Old Musician seems more universal in its 
meaning than a depiction of these people's isolation and homelessness. 
The painting, in its overall inscrutability, asks to be read as an alle-
29. Fried, Manet's Sources, supra note 21, at 29-33. 
30. Id. at 69 n.27. 
31. It is perhaps not incidental that Manet's model for the musician was the leader ofa gypsy 
band, living in a neighborhood of Polish political refugees near the painter's studio. T. REFF, 
MANET AND MODERN PARIS 174 (1982). Interestingly, the musician appears to have been 
modeled as well on an ancient statue of the philosopher Chrysippos, which Manet sketched in 
the Louvre in 1860. G. MAUNER, MANET PEINTRE-PHILOSOPHE: A STUDY OF THE PAINTER'S 
THEMES 50 (1975). A gypsy-philosopher seems precisely suited to an exploration of the exilc-
motif. 
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gory. I cannot keep myself from seeing the graybeard musician as 
God, silently inviting us to ponder His creation. But then He is a God 
whose creatures freeze into enigmatic immobility when the animating 
violin falls silent. And now it has fallen silent - for us, for the be-
holders who have come too soon or too late to hear the Old Musician 
play. If some such allegorizing interpretation bears up, the painting-
beholder relationship in The Old Musician becomes an almost terri-
fying evocation of the exile-motif writ large. 
In all these ways The Old Musician illustrates how modernist for-
mal devices lend themselves to modernist content. The modernist 
moral critique of traditional painting is that painting, art in general, 
has become a form of escapism. And, if it were not the case that some 
aspects of our lives are hard to face up to, why would we need escape? 
The exile is able to find solace in art; but, for the modernist, such 
solace is purchased at the price of truth. The truth of the exile.-motif is 
our homelessness and isolation; and the painter of modem life will 
need to find ways to acknowledge the beholder and the beholder's 
predicament. 
In short: By incorporating the critique of painting into the paint-
ing itself, modernism makes us unable to forget that what we behold is 
a painting, hence unable to forget that we are its beholders, hence un-
able to forget ourselves, hence unable - the modernist hopes - to 
evade who we are. Who we are, according to the modernist, are exiles. 
Modernism stresses that this is our condition by exiling the beholder 
from the world of beautiful illusion created by premodemist art. And 
this is the connection between the exile-motif and the neo-Kantian ac-
count of modernism. 32 
32. Fried's account of this connection is worth quoting at length: 
Manet's ambitions are fundamentally realistic. He starts out aspiring to the objective tran-
scription of reality, of a world to which one wholly belongs, such as he finds in the work of 
Velasquez and Hals. But where Velasquez and Hals took for granted their relation to the 
worlds they belonged to and observed and painted, Manet is sharply conscious that his own 
relation to reality is far more problematic. And to paint his world with the same fullness of 
response, the same passion for truth, that he finds in the work of Velasquez and Hals, means 
that he is forced to paint not merely his world but his problematic relation to it: his own 
awareness of himself as in and yet not of the world. In this sense Manet is the first post-
Kantian painter: the first painter whose awareness of himself raises problems of extreme 
difficulty that cannot be ignored: the first painter for whom consciousness itself is the great 
subject of his art . 
. . . [T]he painting itself is conceived as a kind of tableau vivant ... constructed so as to 
dramatize not a particular event so much as the beholder's alienation from that event .... 
But Manet's desire to make the estranging quality of self-awareness an essential part of 
the content of his work - a desire which, as we have seen, is at bottom realistic - has an 
important consequence: namely, that self-awareness in this particular situation necessarily 
entails the awareness that what one is looking at is, after all, merely a painting. And this 
awareness too must be made an essential part of the work itself .... 
For this reason Manet emphasizes certain characteristics which have nothing to do with 
verisimilitude but which assert that the painting in question is exactly that: a painting. For 
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To put it another way, modernist art is, very literally, iconoclastic. 
Its preeminent concern is to remind us, for moral reasons, that art is 
only art. It reminds us of this by calling attention to the conventions 
that constitute the art, and it does this by abandoning or unmasking 
those conventions. In this sense, modernism is a movement whose 
concern is to deny us the solace of art. (And CLS is modernist to the 
extent that it tries to deny us the solace of liberal legal theory.) For 
this reason its natural content is a grim spiritual state. 
In this respect, there is nothing specially modern in modernism. 
Older artists have had iconoclastic concerns and have expressed them 
in the same ways: calling attention to the artificiality of painting by 
displaying its constitutive conventions, and using this formal device to 
present an anxious, spiritually demanding content. These, I think, 
were the concerns of the great Florentine Mannerists of the early six-
teenth century (Pontormo, Rosso, Bronzino ). In such paintings as 
Pontormo's eerie Carmignano Visitation or his Joseph in Egypt in 
London's National Gallery, Rosso's Moses and the Daughters of Jethro 
in the Uffizi or his bizarre Louvre Pietd, or Bronzino's waxworks por-
traits, we find the modernist combination of disturbing content and a 
manner of painting that compels us to confront explicitly the (onto-
logical) fact that it is painting. 
Similar concerns preoccupied the great Bavarian church builders, 
the Zimmermans, the Asams, Balthasar Neumann: 
[Bavarian rococo] does not let us forget that what the painter furnishes is 
no more than theatre. To make this reminder explicit and to exhibit the 
theatricality of their art, the painters of the Bavarian rococo liked to 
introduce curtains into their already theatrical compositions. Divine 
transcendence becomes manifest only as a play within a play.33 
(Recall Greenberg: "Modernism used art to call attention to art.") 
IV 
Modernist wine need not, then, appear in modernist bottles. 
Heidegger's Being and Time is perhaps the definitive philosophical ex-
example, Manet emphasizes the flatness of the picture-surface by eschewing modelling and 
... refusing to depict depth convincingly, calls attention to the limits of the canvas by 
truncating extended forms with the framing-edge, and underscores the rectangular shape of 
the picture-support by aligning with it, more or less conspicuously, various clements within 
the painting. 
M. FRIED, supra note 20, at 49 n.3. This footnote bears careful reading in its entirety. Note that 
in the final sentence Fried is not discussing The Old Musician, to which, we have seen, the com-
ments apply, but the other two paintings with which Manet is said to have begun modernism: 
Dtfjeuner sur l'Herbe and Olympia. 
33. K. HARRIES, THE BAVARIAN Rococo CHURCH 125 (1983); see id. at 146-55 for further 
interesting discussion. 
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ploration of the exile-motif. Formally, however, it is not particularly 
modernistic: it is a classic ponderous professorial production, which 
fits comfortably on the shelf beside Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and 
Hegel's Science of Logic. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, 
on the other hand, is modernist in form as well as theme, abjuring the 
linear philosophical argument and neat two-, three-, and four-term 
distinctions of the traditionalist treatise for a book of "philosophical 
remarks," "really only an album"34 - the famously teasing dialogues, 
analogies, and aphorisms that have bewitched and befuddled two gen-
erations of philosophers. 
The same distinction operates within CLS. Much CLS work treats 
the modernist exile-motif, but in the standard, nonmodernist form of 
law review articles. Unger's Passion, 35 however, like his manifesto The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 undertakes a few modernist ges-
tures. Passion has no footnotes whatever, nor real chapter titles, nor, 
for that matter, section headings. Many readers find this annoying, 
and some are very irritated indeed. ("Who does he think he is, that he 
doesn't refer to any other writers at all?") Even if one does not have 
this reaction, the lack of signposts makes it very dense going, rather 
like the multi-page run-on sentences and lack of paragraphing and 
chapter headings in Thomas Bernhard's modernist novels. 
Though I think that these formal features are of strictly secondary 
importance in Unger, they may be given a neo-Kantian modernist in-
terpretation. On the neo-Kantian view, remember, a modernist paint-
ing calls attention to presuppositions of painting by violating them -
violating illusionism through abstraction, for example. When Unger 
leaves out all the paraphernalia of legal scholarship, he invites us to 
ask what purpose it serves. Why must every thought be footnoted? (Is 
it because scholars are supposed to derive their ideas from a tradition, 
rather than secluding themselves with their own thoughts?) Why are 
we afraid of argument without precedent? (Is it because lawyers com-
mit the category-mistake of equating legal theory with legal opinions, 
reifying the past in our thinking as we do in appellate decisions?) Why 
must thought be organized in outline form, with neat section head-
ings? (Is it because a more plastic way of thinking is supposed to be 
unrigorous? Is it because we need slogans and labels for thoughts 
before we are able to recognize them?) 
In general, it seems to me that Unger's austere way of proceeding 
34. L. WITIGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS ix (G.E.M. Anscombe trans. 
1953). 
35. R.M. UNGER, supra note 2. 
36. Unger, supra note I. 
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is an attempt to rip down the landmarks and prepackagings that we 
use to negate the strangeness of thought and avoid confronting it on its 
own terms. If I am right, then, these formal devices are modernist in 
the second neo-Kantian sense as well: they attempt explicitly to ac-
knowledge the very problematic relationship between book and reader 
(beholder), by forcing the reader out of the voyeuristic mode in which 
we customarily appropriate scholarship. 
Passion is, nevertheless, only slightly modernist in form. It is an 
explicit treatment of the modernist exile-motif; but mostly it is a tradi-
tional book of philosophy or, perhaps, speculative psychology. I 
would now like to consider the one CLS piece I know of that is 
through-and-through modernist, Peter Gabel and Duncan Kennedy's 
"article" Roll Over Beethoven. 37 
Roll Over Beethoven is a dialogue between "Peter" and "Duncan," 
apparently the transcript of a taped conversation between the article's 
authors. It is exhausting to read - fifty-four pages of transcript that 
often sounds like a pair of old acid-heads chewing over a passage in 
Sartre. (One finds sentences such as this: ''Peter: It is not inconsistent 
to, on the one hand, realize the projective temporal character of 
human existence, in which no one is identity, and the living subject is 
continually not what he or she is by moving into the next moment in a 
creative and constitutive way."38) 
Roughly put, the topic of the conversation is the role of theory in 
the CLS movement, Duncan accusing Peter of "betraying our pro-
gram by conceptualizing it,"39 and Peter replying that "we can be ex-
plicit about what it is that human beings are trying to do."40 But this 
is very rough: the conversation is complex, passing from one topic to 
another in the improvisatory manner of real conversations. About 
halfway through, it turns to the topic of rights, and various themes 
interweave from that point on. 
The tone of much of the conversation is cheeky. Duncan demon-
strates his impatience with the language of theory by replacing Peter's 
term "unalienated relatedness" with "intersubjective zap" and "mak-
ing the kettle boil,"41 remarking that if you don't watch out, "the body 
snatchers are always nearby, and you wake up and they're all pods. 
The whole conceptual structure has been turned into a cluster of 
37. Gabel & Kennedy, Roll Over Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984). 
38. Id. at 19. 
39. Id. at I. 
40. Id. at 5. 
41. Id. at 4-5. 
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pods."42 Academicians, apparently, are the body snatchers. 
Roll Over Beethoven certainly satisfies the external criteria of mod-
ernism. It makes people mad. (Rumor has it that a well-known pro-
fessor was so upset when Kennedy presented Roll Over Beethoven at 
the Columbia Legal Theory Workshop that he totaled his car on the 
way home.) If you're looking for scholarship, you will leave Roll Over 
Beethoven hungry; you might remark, as two well-known abstract 
painters did at Jasper Johns' first show, "If this is painting, I might as 
well give up," and "Well, I am still involved with the dream."43 
Furthermore, Roll Over Beethoven appears with the maximum 
hype (it is the first article in the Stanford Law Review CLS symposium 
issue - the largest-selling single law review issue in history, inciden-
tally - which is a batch of polemics and auto-commentaries that 
would have been completely familiar in tone and purpose to the pro-
tagonists and antagonists of early modernism's art wars). It can im-
press readers as a complete fraud. And one can be confident that its 
authors are in no better position than any other reader to judge 
whether that is what it is. 
My own initial reaction to Roll Over Beethoven was that it was a 
pile of crap. How dare they waste my time with a self-indulgent rap 
session! I was able to read only the first half of the article - it is tiring 
- then dipped into a few more pages to assure myself that it was all of 
a piece, then made fun of it to everyone within earshot. It's boring. 
It's rude. If Duncan Kennedy weren't notorious (and from Harvard), 
no journal would touch it without using tongs. Gabel ought to bum 
his library of phenomenology and take a cold shower. Anyone can 
tum on a tape-recorder and reel off a lot of pretentious pickle-smoke. 
You recognize a classic reaction to modernism. Anyone can do a 
drip-painting. Anyone can make random percussion sounds. It isn't 
real art, or music, or legal theory, or philosophy, or, or, or .... 
I reread Roll Over Beethoven. On second reading, it no longer 
struck me as insolent. Instead, I was amazed at how courageous the 
authors were for exposing so much of themselves, putting an intimate 
conversation out in public. Besides, a lot of what they are saying is 
quite important, quite true. But why do it that way? 
I decided to read Roll Over Beethoven as a piece of neo-Kantian 
modernism. And points like these began to stand out: 
(1) Why is a transcript an inferior form of scholarship to a didac-
tic, heavily footnoted article? The purpose of scholarship is the com-
42. Id. at 7. 
43. L. STEINBERG, supra note 4, at 13. 
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munication and exploration of thought; why is the solitary research 
effort a better form of such endeavor than an intense conversation be-
tween two scholars who have a lot in common? Roll Over Beethoven 
throws into question the (quite un-Socratic!) presupposition of tradi-
tional scholarship that a monologue is a better vehicle of thought than 
a dialogue. And a dialogue, in turn, implies a kind of ethical relation-
ship between its interlocutors quite different from the author-reader 
relationship. (And it is too, too perfect that the editors of the Stanford 
Law Review added their own footnotes to try to tame their unruly 
article - footnotes explaining, for example, that "body snatchers" 
and "pods" are references to the film Invasion of the Body Snatchers.) 
(2) Roll Over Beethoven confronts us with the question of 
whether it actually is the transcript of a taped conversation between its 
authors, rather than a composed dialogue between the literary per-
sonae "Peter" and "Duncan" - whether, to put it another way, it is a 
(mere?) mechanical production or the product of composition and vir-
tuosity. The invidious contrast raised by this question is, of course, 
the site of a battle which photography had to win in the last century to 
be accepted as art, and which a variety of modernist productions have 
fought ever since; and overcoming the contrast may well have changed 
forever our concept of what an art object is.44 
The contrast, however, must be overcome anew every time a 
mechanical production process raises the worry that a piece is fraudu-
lent. In the case of Roll Over Beethoven it seems to me that the con-
trast between mechanical production and virtuoso composition makes 
no difference. I do not believe that we would admire the work more if 
we learned that it was through-composed rather than taped and tran-
scribed. Nor (on the other side of the ledger) would it invalidate the 
moral point of the dialogue form if we learned that the article was 
carefully written, rather than spontaneously uttered in the heat of con-
versation. This, I think, shows that it is a successful modernist piece. 
Like the first art photographs (or the film My Dinner with Andre, 45 
which Roll Over Beethoven in many ways resembles), it demonstrates 
its nonfraudulence by making the question seem irrelevant. To over-
state the matter: Roll Over Beethoven begins to change the whole way 
we think of a scholarly article. 
(3) The dialogue form perfectly exemplifies the first of Unger's 
modernist theses: "[O]ur dealings with other individuals have pri-
44. The great discussion of this issue is W. BENJAMIN, The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction, in ILLUMINATIONS 219-53 (1955); see also Benjamin, Walter Benja-
min's Short History of Photography, ARTFORUM, Feb. 1977, at 46, 46-47. 
45. New Yorker Films 1981. 
1674 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1656 
macy over the search for an impersonal reality or good. And among 
all encounters [modernists] ascribe special importance to those that 
put in question the relation between the requirements of self-
assertion. "46 
( 4) Many people find one of Roll Over Beethoven's most irritating 
features to be its serene presumption that the reader is interested in the 
minutiae of CLS internal debates and uncritically committed to the 
same radical values as CLS. (The piece is monumentally uninteresting 
to those for whom this presumption is false.) But - and this is a 
question that I take the piece to be inviting - what makes Roll Over 
Beethoven different in this respect from more standard law review 
fare? Most law review articles, after all, presume that the reader is 
interested in the minutiae of standard technocratic policy debates and 
is uncritically committed to the blandly centrist values they presup-
pose. It is just that we have become so habituated to these presump-
tions that we do not notice them. Roll Over Beethoven makes us notice 
them. 
(5) The subject of much of Roll Over Beethoven is the exile-motif, 
the unfulfilled desire for solidarity, for unalienated relatedness, for in-
tersubjective zap. In part the dialogical form of Roll Over Beethoven is 
supposed to illustrate what it is that we're missing; but in part it is 
supposed to illustrate that Duncan and Peter are missing it too. 
In one crucial passage in the dialogue, Duncan and Peter are dis-
cussing a conversation some people had at CLS summer camp(!). Peter 
takes that conversation to be illustrative of the kettle boiling: "Every-
one in the room was participating, intensely interested, and there." 
Duncan replies noncommittally, "I remember it clearly";47 Peter goes 
on with an analysis; and Duncan comes back as follows: "Here's what 
I remember about what made it a wonderful and dramatic occasion. I 
think this may be quite different from your memory of it. My memory 
may be wrong. I think the discussion was actually not a satisfactory 
discussion; people were not feeling good .... "48 (He then goes on to 
explain what eventually made it animated.) 
Nothing is more jarring than having someone tell you that an im-
portant memory is haywire. Indeed, if anything could count as a 
theme for early modernist literature, it is the elusiveness and impor-
tance of memory, the uncontrollable and unpredictable window it of-
fers us, the solitude of being trapped in memory, as well as the solitude 
46. R.M. UNGER, supra note 2, at 35; see text at note 14 supra. 
47. Gabel & Kennedy, supra note 37, at 12. 
48. Id. at 13. 
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of being debarred from it. At this moment in the conversation, 
Duncan and Peter confront vividly a major component of the exile-
motif - in Unger's words cited previously, "skepticism about the pos-
sibility of . . . gaining access to another mind" (or even one's own 
mind).49 -
(6) The dialogue form of Roll Over Beethoven invites the reader 
to question his or her own relationship to the conversation in the arti-
cle. They are talking, I am (merely?) reading/beholding/eavesdrop-
ping. Is reading/beholding/eavesdropping - the partaking of the 
fruits of others' theoretical labor at a distance - itself a kind of aliena-
tion? (Notice that this question is one construal of the subject matter 
of the dialogue: form and content fit perfectly together.) Roll Over 
Beethoven acknowledges the beholder in a modernist - that is, icono-
clastic - way. 
Much more could be said about Roll Over Beethoven, but there is 
no need to labor the point further. In my view, Roll Over Beethoven is 
a successful modernist achievement. It keeps working on you after 
you have set it aside. 
v 
Modernism is self-critical and iconoclastic. Under its neo-Kantian 
interpretation, however, I have claimed that it amounts to much more 
(or less) than an undifferentiated negation of the premodernist tradi-
tion. It is a determinate negation of premodem art, accepting 
premodemism's claim to quality, denying only its power to maintain 
conviction now, aiming to attain premodernism's level of achievement 
by disassembling its constitutive conventions piecemeal. 
There is another interpretation of modernism, however, one that is 
more in line with the leftist and counterculture sensibilities of CLS, 
but which I wish to criticize and warn against. For want of a better 
term, I shall use Greenberg's and call this the "avant-gardist interpre-
tation. "50 (Greenberg means the word "avant-gardist" - as distinct 
from "avant-garde" - pejoratively.) 
Avant-gardism wants to bury the past, not criticize it. It proceeds 
from the premise that respect for the achievements of premodernism is 
itself suspect - perhaps because respect is produced by suspect ideol-
ogy, or because premodernist achievements are too implicated in cul-
tural values that the avant-gardist wants to smash. Avant-gardism 
49. See text at note 17 supra. 
50. Greenberg, Counter-Avant-Garde, ART INTL., May 20, 1971, at 16. 
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relishes the Shock of the New because it relishes shock and it relishes 
novelty. It doesn't trust anything over thirty. 
Avant-gardists practice a version of modernism that Unger criti-
cizes as a "heresy" from the legitimate modernist teaching. 
Their divinization of the self has often led them to pass from the convic-
tion that the person transcends his contexts to the intolerance of all lim-
its, whether the constraints of the body or those of society .... [The 
individual] can assert his independence only by a perpetual war against 
the fact of contextuality, a war that he cannot hope to win but that he 
must continue to wage.st 
(Unger himself calls in Passion for a modernist reconstruction of a 
very traditional picture of personality, and in The Critical Legal Stud-
ies Movement for a "deviationist" reconstruction of extant legal doc-
trine. This willingness to make the premodernist past his starting 
point marks these as neo-Kantian rather than avant-gardist works.) 
The avant-gardist interpretation sees modernism primarily as cul-
tural-revolutionary context-smashing - as the attempt to do away 
with art rather than find new ways to make it. It does not care to 
disassemble an art's constitutive conventions, so that through their ab-
sence we can understand what their presence meant; it simply wants to 
destroy them. Growing out of Dada and Surrealism, avant-gardism 
achieved something of a mass following in the 1960s and 1970s in the 
form of Happenings, multi-media art, some Pop Art, some rock, some 
punk and New Wave. 
I will shortly consider the impulse to avant-gardism a bit more 
deeply and suggest that this impulse is realized in some of the 
"postmodernist" theory utilized by CLS scholars. First, however, I 
want to ask why the avant-gardist interpretation of modernism is at-
tractive to those of left political views, including CLS. 
One of the attractions of avant-gardism to leftists is its association 
with the cultural-revolutionary political sensibilities of the 1960s. I do 
mean "sensibilities," for avant-gardism was evinced more in the style 
of the sixties than in the substance of the political issues leftists ad-
dressed (Vietnam, race, women's liberation). 
As an example of this sensibility, one might consider the "Situa-
tionist International" (IS), a small post-Surrealist group that began in 
France in 1958 and made a deep imprint on the colossal upheaval of 
May 1968. The IS, through its journal and the prolixity of its theoreti-
cians, left behind it a formidable body of dense radical theory;52 but -
as the Situationists themselves would have wanted it - it is through 
51. R.M. UNGER, supra note 2, at 36. 
52. See, e.g .. G. DEBORD, LA SOCIETE DU SPECTACLE (1968); R. VANEIGEM, TRAITE DE 
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their slogans and style that the IS is remembered. It was the Situa-
tionists who gave Parisian students, prying up cobblestones to make 
barricades, their slogan ''Sous le pave, la plage" ("Under the paving-
stones, the beach!"). They covered the walls of the universities with 
other slogans inspired by artistic modernism: "The sky will not be blue 
again until we reinvent it"; "Power to the imagination!"; "Poetry in 
the streets." One finds a good deal of Situationist language in Unger, 
who frequently appeals to us to "invent" or "imagine" new forms of 
social existence, as though the rightful successor to law will be art. 
More memorably, the IS created what became the cliche format of 
leftist publications (employed by CLS members in the "alternative" 
newspaper they distributed at the 1984 convention of the Association 
of American Law Schools): Pop-style single cartoon-strip panels, frag-
ments of old drawings, collages of advertising slogans snipped out of 
context. The mix of Pop, mass-culture icons, and black humor that 
we associate with sixties leftism emerged in large part out of the obscu-
rities of aesthetic theories forged in the furnaces of post-Surrealism in 
the late 1950s. And for those whose political sympathies lie with the 
residues of sixties leftism, it is natural to find affinities with its avant-
gardist roots. · 
A second point of affinity between avant-gardism and a leftist 
political sensibility may be found in the aesthetic doctrines of the 
Frankfurt School, so-called "Critical Theory." Critical Theory has 
had an influence upon CLS, as the similarity in names suggests, and it 
accords avant-gardism an important political role. This may be seen 
in the most influential book by the Frankfurt School's most influential 
member - Herbert Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man, 53 one of the 
"must-read" texts of the New Left. 
Marcuse's basic argument is well known. The "technological ra-
tionality" of advanced capitalism swallows up all modes of discourse, 
including oppositional discourse. It provides spurious legitimation by 
means of a soulless hellfire of advertising images which canalize all our 
urges for a truly human freedom into desires for commodities that 
capitalism can satisfy. By making even opposition "one dimensional," 
it ensures that truly fundamental opposition cannot gain a toehold. 
And since rationality has become one dimensional, it follows that our 
last hope, true opposition or "negation," must assume the guise of the 
irrational. 
SAVOIR-VIVRE ). L'USAGE DES JEUNES GENERATIONS (1967), The issues of the journal are 
republished in INTERNATIONALE SJTUATIONNISTE 1958-69 (1975), 
53. H. MARCUSE, ONE-DIMENSIONAL MAN: STUDIES IN THE IDEOLOGY OF ADVANCED 
INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1964). 
' 
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Art plays a crucial role, for "art contains the rationality of nega-
tion. In its advanced positions, it is the Great Refusal - the protest 
against that which is."54 This, according to Marcuse, has always been 
true, even in the case of premodernist art which was in harmony with 
its society's ideals: "[A]lienation characterizes affirmative as well as 
negative art."55 But now, in one-dimensional society, "[a]rtistic alien-
ation succumbs, together with other modes of negation, to the process 
of technological rationality."56 And that is where the avant-garde 
comes in. It is the final revolutionary stronghold against one-
dimensionality: 
[C]ontradiction ... must have a medium of communication. The strug-
gle for this medium, or rather the struggle against its absorption into the 
predominant one-dimensionality, shows forth in the avant-garde efforts 
to create an estrangement which would make the artistic truth again 
communicable. 57 
In itself, there is nothing in this last sentence incompatible with a 
neo-Kantian interpretation of the avant-garde; the sentence amounts 
only to an explanation of why it has become necessary to go modern-
ist. What is avant-gardist in the aesthetics of One-Dimensional Man is 
rather the demand that the artist always remain oppositional (ideally 
"art would become a technique for destroying this business and this 
misery"58) - the dread of cooptation that becomes the badge of the 
Great Refusal. Marcuse ends his book romantically, with a veritable 
Oath of the Horatii: 
The critical theory of society possesses no concepts which could bridge 
the gap between the present and its future; holding no promise and 
showing no success, it remains negative. Thus it wants to remain loyal 
to those who, without hope, have given and give their life to the Great 
Refusal.59 
This theme is strikingly echoed in CLS by Mark Tushnet, who writes: 
"One sides with the party of humanity because it is defined as the 
party in opposition to what exists."60 And again: "And what if things 
change? If there is no transcendent humanity, when things change all 
that will be left is to remain in opposition."61 
Marcuse's views are not entirely consistent with avant-gardism, for 
54. Id. at 63. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 65. 
57. Id at 66. 
58. Id. at 239. 
59. Id. at 257. 
60. Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363, 1398 (1984). 
61. Id. at 1402. 
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Marcuse grants validity to premodernist art; he is respectful of an art's 
past in a way that avant-gardists are not. 62 But - and this is a third 
affinity between avant-gardism and the left - Marxism is in obvious 
ways the most important leftist theory, and Marxism itself suspects 
that to respect the past even a little is to be swindled by an ideology 
that will merely deflect and coopt the revolutionary impulse. In 
Marx's words: 
The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the 
brain of the living. And just when they seem engaged in revolutionising 
themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, 
precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure 
up the spirits of the past . . . . 
The social revolution ... cannot draw its poetry from the past, but 
only from the future. 63 
Within CLS, I believe that this avant-gardist impulse is reflected in 
the practice of "trashing" traditional legal theory, 64 but even more 
strikingly in the wholesale rejection of the concept of rights as - in 
Mark Tushnet's words - "affirmatively harmful to the party of hu-
manity. "65 The appeal to rights is simply another nightmare on the 
brain of the living, another attempt to draw poetry from the past. And 
- the avant-gardist believes - there was no poetry in the past worth 
talking about. 
I wish to pursue the topic of the CLS "critique of rights" a bit 
further, even though my primary aim in this essay is not to engage 
with substantive CLS positions. It may be objected that my assimila-
tion of the rights critique to avant-gardism begs the question. Perhaps 
the moral vocabulary of rights really is unnecessary and harmful; per-
haps rights-talk is more like racism and sexism - things our culture 
would be well rid of - than it is like art or music. 66 In that case, the 
62. How little sympathy Marcuse actually had for avant-gardism and cultural revolution 
may be seen from H. MARCUSE, Art and Revolution, in COUNTERREVOLUTION AND REVOLT 79 
(1972); H. MARCUSE, THE AESTHETIC DIMENSION: TOWARD A CRITIQUE OF MARXIST AES-
THETICS (1978). I take these works to be partial abandonments of the aesthetic views expressed 
in One-Dimensional Man. 
63. K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE OF LOUIS BONAPARTE 13, 16 (1957) (1st ed. 
New York 1852). 
64. I take the term from Kelman, Trashing, 36 STAN. L. REV. 293 (1984). 
65. Tushnet, supra note 60, at 1384; see also Gabel, The Phenomenology of Rights-Conscious-
ness and tlze Pact of the Withdrawn Selves, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1563 (1984). The gap between the 
radical theorist's rejection of rights and the practical needs of radical politics is well illustrated by 
Staughton Lynd's worry that if CLS is correct and rights-talk is abandoned it will be impossible 
to achieve some very important ends of political organization. Lynd, Communal Rights, 62 
TEXAS L. REV. 1417 (1984) (see especially pages 1417-29). 
66. I owe this formulation to Robin West. 
1680 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 84:1656 
assault on rights is part of a legitimately neo-Kantian (rather than 
avant-gardist) modernist program. But I do not think this is so. 
The primary aim of the CLS critique of rights is to debunk the idea 
that legal rights are politically neutral - that they form a fixed and 
determinate coin of the realm, by means of which the business of legal 
controversy may be transacted without bias grounded in either the 
identity or the group membership of the parties. CLS critics wish to 
stress that judges typically manipulate the vocabulary of legal rights so 
as to favor existing hierarchies. 
Suppose we agree that this is true; there would then be several 
routes we could take in order to explain the phenomenon. One route is 
to conclude that when this happens the judges are violating their duty, 
because they are ideologically or personally biased against certain 
groups, or because (as Tocqueville believed) lawyers are better friends 
of order than of liberty, or because in their interest-balancing the inter-
ests of powerful groups always take precedence over those of less pow-
erful. A second route is to argue (in the fashion of Beard) that the 
particular set of legal rights contained (say) in the United States Con-
stitution is biased in any or all of these ways. 
CLS rights-critics, however, choose a more audacious and theoreti-
cally rarefied route, and therein lies their avant-gardism. They claim 
that the problem lies neither in the judges nor in the particular sched-
ule of legal rights currently in effect, but rather in the vocabulary of 
rights as such. In claiming this, they are at once committed to dis-
carding eight hundred years of legal and moral language, and to sug-
gesting that controversy could be conducted in some alternative 
vocabulary. 
The idea of scuttling whole segments of our vocabulary - the po-
etry of the past - has enjoyed considerable attention recently. 67 But 
what does it mean to abolish the whole language of rights? What 
would a new language look like? 
To address these questions, we need to ask what communicative 
purpose the language of rights serves. I believe the answer is this: the 
claim to have a right to a substance is simply the speaker's way of 
asserting an especially strong claim to that substance. 68 
67. See A. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (1981); R. RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR 
OF NATURE (1979); R. RORTY, CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (1982); R. BELLAH, R. MAD· 
SEN, W. SULLIVAN, A. SWIDLER & S. TIPTON, HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND 
COMMITMENT IN AMERICAN LIFE (1985); see also Cornell, supra note 3. 
68. I follow Henry Shue in defining the "substance" of a right as "whatever the right is a 
right to." H. SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS: SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 15 
(1980). 
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That is, we may (roughly) analyze a claim couched in rights-talk as 
follows: 
'~ has a right to S" means that: 
(i) There are valid reasons for guaranteeing that A gets S,· 
(ii) These reasons are among the strongest reasons we acknowl-
edge (i.e., in most but not all contexts they are decisive reasons); 
(iii) These reasons are relatively long-term (i.e., they are not the 
ad hoc creatures of political expediency or momentary or fortuitous 
constellations of events). 69 
And that is all: my claim that I have a right to a substance is a 
claim that there are very strong, long-term reasons for guaranteeing 
me that substance. 1o 
If that is the communicative function of a rights-claim, what does 
it mean to abolish rights-talk? Does it mean getting rid of the word 
"right," the vocabulary of rights? In that case, we shall simply need to 
invent a new word to register claims that there are very strong, long-
term reasons for guaranteeing us a substance. 
Since there is evidently no point to a merely nominal change, the 
rights critique must instead mean something more fundamental: that 
there should be no rights, i.e., that there are no strong long-term rea-
sons we can invoke for guaranteeing us any substances. The demand 
for a priori guarantees against political change is itself unreasonable, 
and no substance should be held immune, even relatively immune, 
from political conflict over its distribution. This I take to be very close 
to the CLS critics' bottom line on rights; but then I return to my initial 
conviction that it is an avant-gardist vision. For now every fixed form 
oflife becomes fluid, and no distribution can ever be taken for granted. 
Stable or dependable contexts as such, and the history that gives rise to 
them, are the enemy. All that is solid melts into air. 
VI 
It is probably evident that I am no fan of the avant-gardist inter-
pretation of modernism. What are my reasons? 
69. Id. at 13. Shue's analysis of a right is somewhat different. 
70. Notice what this analysis does not say. It does not say that the right-bearer is an individ-
ual; so it is neither "individualistic" nor biased against group rights. It does not say that rights 
are absolute. It does not say that rights are ahistorical (only that when they change, it will not be 
overnight). It does not say that rights are (like) property of their possessors, nor that rights are 
things. The analysis does not elevate claims of rights into dubious premises of political argu-
ments; rather it insists that they are conclusions of such arguments. And so, people who talk 
rights-talk are not committed to individualism, absolutism, ahistoricism, property-worship, reifi-
cation, or obfuscation. On the contrary, it is the rights critics who appear to be misled by a form 
of speech into reifying fictitious entities. 
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The most important, of course, is that I revere too much of the 
past - too much art, too much history, too many ideals and institu-
tions - to have any real sympathy with the avant-gardist sensibility. 
This, however, is not an argument, and I do not offer it as one. 
Clearly it begs the avant-gardist's question. And one can surely under-
stand why someone who has keenly experienced our culture's perva-
sive patriarchy or racism might abominate its cultural products, which 
are shot through with the offending attitudes. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that it is virtually impossible for a 
person to live sanely in (to use Unger's words that I have cited above) 
"a perpetual war against the fact of contextuality, a war that he cannot 
hope to win but that he must continue to wage."71 Our lives, our ex-
perience, our language, and our modes of relationship are permeated 
with contexts given by the past, and permanent context-smashing is 
not merely spiritually exhausting, it is destructive of sense. To reject 
the whole of one's culture is to be out of one's mind. 
It is hardly a coincidence that avant-gardism's pantheon is heavily 
stacked with mad artists and thinkers (Holderlin, Nietzsche, Lau-
treamont, Sade, Artaud).72 The Situationists were pleased to number 
the crazed poet Ivan Chtcheglov in their charter membership.73 One 
thing that I find distressing in avant-gardism is that it toys too readily 
with the desirability of extreme experience; lunacy may be Politically 
Correct. As Marcuse argues, "[T]he realm of the irrational becomes 
the home of the really rational - of the ideas which may 'promote the 
art of life.' "74 A passage from Michel Foucault elaborates this theme: 
After Sade and Goya, and since them, unreason has belonged to 
whatever is decisive, for the modem world, in any work of art .... 
Ruse and new triumph of madness: the world that thought to mea-
sure and justify madness through psychology must justify itself before 
madness, since in its struggles and agonies it measures itself by the excess 
of works like those of Nietzsche, of Van Gogh, of Artaud.75 
Now, one may well admire or even love the works of Nietzsche or Van 
Gogh; one may also believe that without their madness these works 
71. R.M. UNGER, supra note 2, at 36; see text at note 51 supra. 
72. Wholly characteristic of avant-gardisrn's infatuation with insanity is G. DELEUZE & F. 
GUATIARI, ANTI-OEDIPUS: CAPITALISM AND SCHIZOPHRENIA (1977). In fact, avant-gardist 
leftism vacillates between denouncing our society for creating schizophrenics and glorying in the 
schizophrenic experience. See R.D. LAING, THE POLITICS OF EXPERIENCE (1967); M. Fou-
CAULT, MADNESS AND CIVILIZATION: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN THE AGE OF REASON 
(1965). 
73. Chtcheglov, Lettres de Loin, 9 INTERNATIONALE SITUATIONNISTE 38 (1964). 
74. H. MARCUSE, supra note 53, at 247. 
75. M. FOUCAULT, supra note 72, at 285, 289. 
August 1986] Legal Modernism 1683 
could not exist. But this does not imply that manic intensity is a state 
one should seek, any more than the fact that Schubert was inspired to 
write great music by the knowledge that he was dying implies that 
mortal illness is a state one should seek. 
It will be objected that I greatly exaggerate the importance of 
avant-gardist toying with madness. But this is to mistake the point. 
Few would deny that avant-gardism makes the quest for extraordinary 
spiritual states, the rhetoric of violence, and contempt for bourgeois 
normality centerpieces of its world view; and my point is that when 
you have done that, unwanted consequences pursue you no matter 
what your intentions. 
I am moved to raise these concerns in part by the great interest 
evinced by CLS theorists in "postmodernist" French philosophy, espe-
cially the work of Foucault and Jacques Derrida. For it seems to me 
that French postmodernism is a primary culprit in the game of glib 
flirtation with a rhetoric of extremity and violence. Foucault, in par-
ticular, chose to write in a very menacing idiom; one need think only 
of the apocalyptic conclusion of The Order of Things: 
[M]an is an invention of recent date. And one perhaps nearing its end. 
If ... some event of which we can at the moment do no more than 
sense the possibility ... were to cause [our categories of knowledge] to 
crumble, ... then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like 
a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea.76 
A similar example is Derrida's essay Tympan, which is written in a 
dense and virtually incomprehensible prose permeated with imagery of 
ravishment, 77 of forcible cunnilingus, 78 of bursting the philosopher's 
palate from within his mouth, 79 of vocal cords being shattered and 
earwigs piercing the eardrum. 80 (It also includes the mandatory, inevi-
table, tedious references to Lautreamont's Chants de Maldoror 81 and 
to Artaud. 82) 
76. M. FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 
387 (1970). 
77. J. DERRIDA, Tympan, in MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY xxv-xxix (1982). This passage is an 
extended sexual double-entendre based on images of a printing-press puncturing fastened-down 
silk, which "watches over its margins as virgin ..• space." Id. at xxvii. 
78. Id. at xviii n.9: "[T]he bloodiness of a disseminated writing comes to separate the lips, to 
violate the embouchure of philosophy, putting its tongue into movement .... " That the "lips" 
referred to are the "small lips of the vulva" is explained at xvii n.9, as well as at xiv n.6. 
79. "To luxate, to tympanize philosophical autism is never an operation ... without some 
carnage of language. Thus if breaks open the roof, the closed spiral unity of the palate .... It is 
no longer a tongue." Id. at xv n.8. 
80. Id. at xvi-xviii (Learis' poem in the margin). 
81. Id. at xiii. 
82. Id. at xv n.8. 
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Why write like this? Tympan offers an important clue to under-
standing the root impulse of avant-gardism. Derrida takes as his text 
in this essay three self-satisfied passages from Hegel suggesting that 
philosophy includes everything else within it. Derrida finds this un-
bearable, and his purpose in writing Tympan is to exemplify a kind of 
discourse that philosophers cannot "hear" as philosophy, and thus "to 
luxate [dislocate] the philosophical ear."83 (Hence the images of vio-
lence performed on the head.) 
Derrida's problem is that Hegel is right: philosophers cannot 
"hear" any criticisms without turning them into philosophical theses, 
and thus the attempt to criticize the very idea of philosophical theses is 
doomed from the outset because philosophy has stacked the deck. 
Derrida's solution is to carve out an idiom so odd and obscure that it 
cannot be rationally reconstructed into philosophical theses, and to 
make it an attack on philosophy through the repeated use of violent 
images directed at philosophy. 
At work here is the impulse to "do" work in philosophy that is not 
just some more philosophy, that cannot be pigeonholed, incorporated 
into philosophy's history, co-opted; work that ·cannot become last 
week's news, that will never be supplanted by something else, never 
aufgehoben. 
This is a deep motivation of avant-gardism. The first issue of the 
Situationists' journal was bound in sandpaper covers, so that you 
couldn't put it on your bookshelf without damaging the books next to 
it. An unshelvable book! An unassimilable piece of philosophy! An 
unco-optable political movement! A painting that can never become a 
footnote in an art-history dissertation! A social structure that nobody 
could possibly oppose! It is exciting prospects like these that inflame 
the avant-gardist imagination. 
The root impulse of avant-gardism, I believe, is the impulse to end 
history, or at least one's epoch in it - to achieve the achievement that 
ends all achievements. Derrida wants to finish off metaphysics ("phal-
logocentrism," as he calls it in his ugly jargon). Foucault wants to 
terminate subjectivity. Successive generations of avant-gardist artists 
want to end art. CLS rights-critics want to abolish legalism. 
CLS theorists often promote this way of thinking as necessary uto-
pianism. I think of it as a kind of messianic impulse in modernism. 
The modernist, unable to rest content with the contexts in which we 
83. Id. at xv. I have been greatly helped in understanding Tympa11 by reading (and discuss· 
ing with her) Deborah Hellman's Dartmouth College bachelor's thesis on Derrida. 
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live, wants finally to be redeemed from all contextuality. No interme-
diate way station between us and the messiah is bearable. 
This (quite understandable) impulse is deceptive, however, because 
we would feel it whether or not the messiah was imminent. Kant noted 
the bitterness of the idea of gradual progress, the idea 
that the earlier generations appear to carry through their toilsome labor 
only for the sake of the later . . . and yet that only the latest of the 
generations should have the good fortune to inhabit the building on 
which a long line of their ancestors had ... labored without being per-
mitted to partake of the fortune they had prepared. 84 
It is precisely this melancholy thought that kindles the messianic 
yearning, the inevitable yearning to be that "latest of the generations." 
The impulse is dangerous because it leads us to treat the messianic 
moment as a goal at which we can aim. But since such a moment by 
definition involves a drastic rupture with all the preexisting contexts 
we use to make sense of things, we cannot take it as a goal because it 
has no content at all. Our aims are of necessity modeled on what we 
can know, and that, like it or not, entails giving the ghost of dead 
generations its due - modeling one's achievement on past achieve-
ments, aiming at amelioration rather than annihilation, leaving open 
the possibility of being co-opted.85 (I take this neo-Kantian caution to 
be one of Unger's main points in Passion and The Critical Legal Stud-
ies Movement.) 
For all these reasons, then, I think we should favor the neo-Kant-
ian over the avant-gardist interpretation of modernism. I do not deny 
avant-gardism's allure; I urge only that, by hurling us into combat to 
revalue all values, avant-gardism imposes unlivable, deceptive, and 
spiritually destructive requirements on us. 
The Situationist International shrank as its members were expelled 
for ideological deviations. Legend has it that it dissolved when the last 
two members met in a cafe and agreed to expel themselves because 
they, too, had sold out. 
VII 
One of the more obscure of the Situationist slogans was "Create 
situations!" The first issue of their journal defined a "constructed situ-
84. I. KANT, Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View, in ON HISTORY 
14 (1963), I 
85. I draw the argument of this paragraph from W. BENJAMIN, Theologico-Political Frag-
ment, in REFLECTIONS 312, 312 (1978): "From the standpoint of history [the Kingdom of God] 
is not the goal, but the end. . . . The order of the profane should be erected on the idea of 
happiness." 
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ation" as a "moment of life, concretely and deliberately constructed by 
the collective organization of a unitary ambiance and a play of 
events."86 Situationism was to be a kind of multi-media guerrilla 
theater. 
But there is something wrong with being theatrical outside the the-
ater - or even in the theater, if we are to believe the modernist theo-
rists Brecht and Artaud. Think, for example, of what we mean when 
we accuse a friend of posturing, of being theatrical, in personal life. 
One of the most important facts about art works is that (in Cavell's 
words) "we treat them in special ways, invest them with a value which 
normal people otherwise reserve only for other people - and with the 
same kind of scorn and outrage."87 It is because art matters to us in 
ways that people matter to us, and because one way an art work (like a 
person) can betray us is by posturing, that the theatricality of art is an 
important issue. 
Fried argues in his crucial neo-Kantian essay Art and Objecthood 
for two theses: "1) The success, even the survival of the arts has come 
increasingly to depend on their ability to def eat theatre. . . . 2) Art 
degenerates as it approaches the condition of theatre."88 This seems 
mysterious, until we realize that the theater is defined by two condi-
tions: it involves play-acting, and it depends for its success on self-
consciousness, even hyper-awareness, of the way the performance 
looks to the audience. And Fried's criticism can be understood thus: 
When a work of modernist art rests its claim to our attentiveness on 
theatrical effects, it operates merely by manipulating our situation; it 
achieves notoriety without achieving quality. It fails in the way that I 
have suggested is characteristic of modernist art: it is (not mediocre 
but) fraudulent. 
One can readily imagine examples of purely theatrical modernist 
works: a sculpture that depends for its effectiveness on sheer size, a 
light so bright that you can't look at it, music that has nothing going 
for it but high volume. Each of these may attract attention in the art 
gallery or concert hall; each may be defended with passionate aesthetic 
arguments; but, in the end, each depends for its effectiveness on some-
thing that is aesthetically irrelevant. Though it can compel our atten-
tion, theatrical art does not reward our attentiveness. 
Avant-gardist work, I believe, is inherently theatrical; it glories 
and exults in the theatrical, for its claim to status as a political force is 
86. 1 INTERNATIONALE SITUATIONNJSTE 13 (1958) (translation provided). 
87. S. CAVELL, supra note 9, at 198. 
88. Fried, Art and Objecthood, supra note 26, at 139, 141. 
August 1986] Legal Modernism 1687 
that it confronts us in our situations -it (re)creates situations. But, if 
the neo-Kantian arguments I have advanced in this essay are sound, 
this is no virtue. This point bears emphasis. I have claimed that mod-
ernism's mode of failure is inauthenticity or theatricality; and I am 
now suggesting that theatricality is characteristic of avant-gardist 
work. Thus, my suggestion amounts to the claim that avant-gardism 
is one shape modernism assumes when it fails. 
VIII 
It is time, finally, to say a bit more explicitly what the significance 
is of modernism, and of the distinction I have drawn between neo-
Kantianism and avant-gardism, for law and social theory. 
Let me make one point clear: My criticisms of avant-gardism are 
not intended as criticisms of radical leftist politics, only of an interpreta-
tion of such politics. It should be evident, in fact, that I have been 
assuming throughout this essay that modernism is roughly correct: 
that the social contexts in which we organize our activities (and now 
we may think of legal and social systems) are no longer able to sustain 
the conviction of their own legitimacy, and hence, that they demand a 
more-or-less drastic criticism and revision. Many people will disagree 
with this; and, though this essay is surely not the occasion for under-
taking a defense of this critical stance, a few remarks may be 
appropriate. 
Let us follow the procedure of this essay and break the modernist 
thesis down into two components - the moral criticism of pre-
modemism's dissembling conventions and the exile-motif. The exile-
motif is itself a conjunction of two ideas, which I have labeled "home-
lessness" (i.e.,. in any given context) and "isolation" (i.e., from each 
other). I will treat these three concepts in reverse order. 
Isolation. The isolation thesis in social theory is familiar as an 
avant-gardist claim - raised by a variety of social critics, including 
perhaps its most drastic formulation in Debord's Situationist tract La 
Societe du Spectacle 89 - that we are a "lonely crowd," leading lives of 
quiet desperation, irretrievably- alienated from each other. In legal 
theory, it may be found in Gabel's argument that when we understand 
our mutual relationships legalistically (e.g., as an interplay of rights) 
we become "withdrawn selves" engaged in a desperate prevarication.9° 
But many of us are inclined to protest this avant-gardist diagnosis 
of our condition: rumors of our demise are, we think, exaggerated. 
89. See G. DEBORD, supra note 52. 
90. Gabel, supra note 65. 
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Our encounters may appear "alienated," after all, only because we 
now have a richer variety of them; and we may seem like bad-faith 
role-players, Sartrian cafe-waiters, only because the social theorist 
doesn't really get to know us. We play a variety of roles, after all, and 
it is small wonder that to the superficial observer - particularly one 
determined to find something wrong - no one of them seems more 
than a caricature of a person.91 (Consider this example from Marcuse: 
"The subway during evening rush hour. What I see of the people are 
tired faces and limbs, hatred and anger. . . . [M]ost of them will prob-
ably have some awful togetherness or aloneness at home."92 How the 
hell does he know?) 
I propose a more plausible neo-Kantian version of the isolation 
thesis. The great variety of our roles and encounters are in themselves 
neither causes nor symptoms of alienation. Rather, as our field of 
awareness and communication widens we become more conscious of 
social conflict, because we become more aware of people who are dif-
ferent from us; and this heightened awareness of conflict may itself 
estrange us from each other. Disillusionment about the existence of 
consensus can actually accelerate the unraveling of whatever consen-
sus there is. The problem is not alienation, but strife.93 
This is one aspect of the problem that Unger describes as our 
heightened awareness of "contextuality." By that he means that we 
are more conscious of other people's membership in interest groups or 
social classes in conflict with ours; we see these contexts as condition-
ing their behavior. And to that extent we mistrust them. ("They only 
say that because they are X ") The avant-gardist's alienation thesis 
may be only a conjecture; but I take it as a plain fact that ours is a 
wary age. 
And wariness, mistrust, is a form of isolation. Those we do not 
trust we hold at arm's length, and an arm's-length society makes 
everything difficult for itself. In fact, as Luhmann has written, "a 
complete absence of trust would prevent [one] even from getting up in 
the morning. "94 
Noticing the social centrality of trust leads us directly to consider 
one way that the theme of isolation can be raised in legal theory. Re-
91. These replies come from N. LUHMANN, GRUNDRECHTE ALS INSTITUTION: EIN BEl-
TRAG ZUR POLmSCHEN SOZIOLOGIE 50-51 (1965). 
92. H. MARCUSE, supra note 53, at 227. 
93. For an enlightening CLS discussion of the loss of consensus in modern liberal society, see 
R.M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY: TOWARD A CRITICISM OF SOCIAL THEORY 166-70 
(1976). 
94. N. LUHMANN, Trust: A Mechanism for the Reduction of Social Complexity, in TRUST 
AND POWER 1, 4 (1979). 
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cently, in a pair of suggestive and important essays, the philosopher 
Annette Baier has argued that trust, not obligation, is the root phe-
nomenon upon which moral theory should focus.95 The legal surro-
gate for trust - enforceable obligation - itself amounts, after all, 
simply to trusting enforcement authorities more than one trusts one's 
obligor, and so enforceable obligation itself is nothing but a special 
case of trust. (A society of Holmesian Bad Men is an impossibility 
because the enforcement authorities, and those who monitor them in 
turn, would also be Bad Men; Holmes inconsistently presupposed that, 
somewhere in the governmental apparatus, there would be Good Men, 
that is, trustworthy men.) 
Baier speculates that obligation, contract, and voluntary agree-
ment came to be seen as paradigms of liberal morality because the 
(male!) moralist took as his paradigm _of social intercourse 
cool, distanced relations between more or less free and equal adult stran-
gers, say, the members of an all male club, with membership rules and 
rules for dealing with rule breakers and where the form of cooperation 
was restricted to ensuring that each member could read his Times in 
peace and have no one step on his gouty toes. 96 
This emphasis on "cool, distanced relations between free and equal 
adult strangers" may or may not correctly characterize moral theory, 
but it surely characterizes legal theory; and so, if Baier is right, to 
understand ourselves in the terms of legal theory is to understand our-
selves in a way that ignores and undermines the trust that actually 
makes the world go 'round. Legal theory partakes of isolation, in 
short, because its central concepts are based on a paradigm of arm's-
length relationships between adults - a paradigm of isolation. 
My emphasis on mistrust and strife as the components of modern-
ist isolation is neo-Kantian because, unlike the avant-gardist's focus on 
desperation and metaphysical estrangement, it builds its radical vision 
on a determinate content: trust and agreeableness, after all, are ideals 
that we understand and live with every day. The avant-gardist, by 
contrast, must hold out to us as an ideal the end of alienation, a messi-
anic and contentless vision of communality. 
Homelessness. By "homelessness," remember, I am referring to 
the modernist understanding of contexts - the modernist skepticism 
that any fixed context, set of roles, or station in life is a natural home 
for us:· In legal theory, the experience of homelessness appears as 
skepticism that any set of rules, procedures, or reforms will actually 
95. Baier, Trust and Antitrust, 96 ETHICS 231 (1986); Baier, What Do Women Want in a 
Moral Theory?, 19 NoOs 53, 56-61 (1985). 
96. Baier, Trust and Antitrust, supra note 95, at 248. 
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achieve justice. Unger describes this eloquently as "a basic, common 
experience in modem society . . . : the sense of being surrounded by 
injustice without knowing where justice lies."97 
Unlike the case of the isolation-motif, here I do not really find a 
difference between neo-Kantian and avant-gardist interpretations of 
this experience, unless the avant-gardist interpretation is to be a 
wholesale skepticism about the concept of justice that I do not see 
anyone, in or out of CLS, espousing. I will without further discussion 
maintain that the experience Unger describes is a precise expression in 
legal theory of the modernist theme of homelessness. And I will as-
sume with Unger that the experience is one that many or most people 
share. 
There is a kind of poetic justice here. The most famous of all mod-
ernist novels is Kafka's The Trial, which hit upon involvement in a 
modem legal process as a perfect metaphor for expressing the exile-
motif. If anything is to count as a political theme of The Trial - as 
opposed to the obvious theological and existential themes - it is the 
"basic, common experience in modem society ... of being surrounded 
by injustice without knowing where justice lies." It is hard to forget 
such images as Joseph K., indicted but unable to discover the crime of 
which he is accused, or the gatekeeper at the Court closing forever the 
door to justice that existed only for him. Now we find that the circle 
has closed. Modernist art such as The Trial offers us the truly illumi-
nating metaphors with which to understand the legal system.98 
The critique of premodernism. Modernist art, I have argued, is de-
fined in part by its impulse to subject premodemist work to searing 
criticism, laying bare its constitutive conventions and displaying the 
way in which these dissemble about the relationship between art and 
its beholder. 
I find the analogue in the CLS criticism of what are taken to be 
organizing principles in the various departments of legal doctrine -
property, criminal law, etc. 
CLS's best-known work has consisted of an attempt to show that 
liberal legalism has masked the arbitrary character of law by insisting 
that the acts of will that make it up are themselves responding to prin-
ciples of sound public policy. Typically, a CLS "deconstruction" of an 
area of law shows that these principles could as easily have led to a 
different, opposing, result. And the conclusion of such a critique is the 
97. R.M. UNGER, supra note 93, at 175. 
98. See, e.g., West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consellt in the Moral a11d 
Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985). 
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claim that law is indeterminate and thus open to extralegal determina-
tion, such as determination by class or gender interest. This fact un-
dercuts law's claim to universality. 
I am skeptical of such arguments. The fact that the result of a case 
does not follow from legal principles as a theorem follows from axioms 
does not show the absence of determinacy. It shows only the absence 
of mechanical determinacy. But that is a pretty weak result: it is 
scarcely surprising to learn that judgments involve judgment-calls, and 
it is clear that judgment-calls cannot themselves be carried out by 
mechanically applying rules, on pain of infinite regress - we would 
need rules telling us how to apply the rules of judgment, and further 
rules telling us how to apply those, and so on.99 
The ability to make judgment-calls arises from immersion in a cul-
ture, a set of social practices of rule application. The indeterminacy 
thesis, then, amounts to a mistrust of any such contextually formed 
capacity. Thus, Joseph William Singer dismisses determination if it 
arises (merely) from "legal culture, conventions, 'common sense,' and 
politics. Custom, rather than reason, narrows the choices and sug-
gests the result."100 Apparently, legal rules cannot be determinate if 
their application depends in any way on custom or convention. 
In fact, however, the regress argument described above shows that 
no rules are determinate under such an austere constraint. 101 This in-
cludes rules of language use. And so, if Singer's argument is correct it 
does not undermine only the possibility of legal discourse; it under-
mines the possibility of discourse of any sort. A contrast between rea-
son and custom that has such consequences cannot be sustained. 
Similarly, Unger argues that legal formalism depends upon the 
view that words have "plain meanings." This, Unger believes, presup-
poses a doctrine of "intelligible essences" and is thus incompatible 
with a "conventionalist" view of language, i.e., a view that makes the 
plain meaning of words rest on conventions or shared practices. But 
conventionalism is the modern, i.e., postmedieval, view of nature and 
99. This is a point emphasized by both Kant and Wittgenstein. I have discussed their argu-
ments in Luban, Epistemology and Moral Education, 33 J. LEGAL ED. 636 (1983). 
100. Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. l, 25 
(1984). My understanding of these issues has been greatly assisted by Stick, Can Nihilism Be 
Pragmatic?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 332 (1986). For discussion of judgment, see R. BEINER, POLIT-
ICAL JUDGMENT (1983); H. ARENDT, LECTURES ON KANT'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (1982). 
101. Another, related, line of argument leading to the same conclusion is Wittgenstein's 
"rule-skepticism" in the Investigations. L. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 34. For a contemporary 
discussion, sees. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE (1982), an 
elaboration of arguments first presented in R. FoGELIN, WITTGENSTEIN 138-71 (1976). A criti-
cism of rule-skepticism that is quite germane to the indeterminacy thesis is G.P. BAKER & 
P.M.S. HACKER, SCEPTICISM, RULES AND LANGUAGE (1984). 
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science, and so formalism is incompatible with a belief in modern 
science. 102 
Much is wrong in this argument - indeed, everything is wrong in 
it. First, there is no reason to believe that a scientific world view is 
incompatible with a suitably sophisticated essentialism. 103 Second, it 
is untrue that giving up on intelligible essences means giving up on the 
ability to "subsume situations under rules"104 as Unger claims: to 
deny that a judgment subsuming a situation under a rule is essentially 
true is not to deny that it is true, and no classical essentialist ever said 
otherwise.105 Third, even intelligible essences - nonconventional lin-
guistic rules - would not help us make such subsumptions unless they 
too were buttressed by conventions: for our regress argument shows 
that we would need rules about how to apply those rules, rules about 
how to apply those, and so on.106 
Even leaving all this aside, however, the basic objection that I 
raised against Singer remains. Unger's attack on the plain meaning of 
language clearly does not rule out only legal formalism. It rules out 
all discourse. I take this to be a straightforward reductio ad absurdum 
of the argument.101 
This part of the CLS critique is, in fact, a version of Unger's "he-
102. R.M. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND PoLmcs 92-94 (1975). 
103. The best-known contemporary defense of essentialism is S. KRlPKE, NAMING AND NE-
CESSITY (1972). 
104. R.M. UNGER, supra note 102, at 93. 
105. I owe this point to an unpublished review of Unger's Knowledge and Politics by Mark 
Sago ff. 
106. Unger may wish to reply that to call an essence intelligible is to assert that it can be 
applied to its instances without appeal to conventions or further essences, and so the regress 
problem is avoided. But this was not how the doctrine of intelligible essences was understood in 
antiquity. Indeed, the regress problem was known to the first philosopher to formulate a doc-
trine of intelligible essences: it is a version of the so-called "Third Man Argument" in Plato's 
Parmenides (132a-b). Parmenides asks Socrates this question: You believe that large things arc 
large in virtue of a form [le., intelligible essence] of Largeness; in virtue of what, then, will large 
things and the Form of Largeness all be large? If it is in virtue of another Form of Largeness, we 
will be confronted with an infinite regress of Forms. 
We may understand Parmenides' argument as a (rough) version of a different question -
"You believe in Forms; how can we know that a Form 'applies to' a given object, i.e., that a given 
object participates in that Form?" - and a different answer - "Not by virtue of another Form, 
on pain of infinite regress!" And this is just the regress argument discussed in the text. 
On the interpretation of the Third Man Argument, see the classic Vlastos-Sellars debate: 
Vlastos, The Third Man Argument in the Parmenides, 63 PHIL. REV. 319 (1954); Sellars, Vlastos 
and the "Third Man," 64 PHIL. REV. 405 (1955); Vlastos, Addenda to the Third Ma11 Arg11me11t: 
A Reply to Professor Sellars, 64 PHIL. REV. 438 (1955); w. SELLARS, Vlastos a11d "The Third 
Man'': A Rejoinder, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 55 (1959). 
107. Unger's views about indeterminacy seem to me to be in flat contradiction to his neo-
Kantian claim on behalf of deviationist doctrine. If doctrine is always and in principle indetermi-
nate, how would substituting "counter-principles" in doctrine do anyone any good? Doctrine 
would still be completely indeterminate. 
August 1986] Legal Modernism 1693 
retical" modernist thesis, which I have termed avant-gardist: "skepti-
cism about the possibility of ... gaining access to another mind." (For 
what is discourse if not our normal means of gaining access to another 
mind?) Such skepticism carries with it the mistrust of judgment, since 
judgments can only be shared, not discursively justified "all the way 
down." Undercut the ground for sharing another's judgment, and you 
eliminate the possibility of judgment altogether; no wonder indetermi-
nacy follows. Unger's arguments for indeterminacy violate his own 
warning against this heresy. Skepticism about other minds may be in-
teresting and important to think about: but we should not take too 
seriously the prospect that it might be true. 
The neo-Kantian version of the critique of doctrine, on the other 
hand, does not suppose that all doctrinal principles are arid. Instead, 
it takes as a starting point the ethical ideals supposedly incorporated in 
the organizing principles of doctrine, demonstrates how they have 
been distorted in practice to suppress legitimate interests, and tries to 
show how they are to be worked up to empower, rather than suppress, 
those interests. This program is what Unger has called "deviationist 
doctrine," 108 and it perfectly exemplifies neo-Kantian modernism. 
IX 
It may be objected, here or earlier, that in associating CLS writers 
with avant-gardism I am simply setting up a straw man. I am sympa-
thetic to this objection, and I would like to stress that no CLS writer I 
have read is simply or flat-footedly avant-gardist. The situation is 
more complicated than that. 
What I find is writings that have an avant-gardist "sound" though 
they do not make avant-gardist arguments; or that make avant-gardist 
arguments with neo-Kantian qualifications or reservations; or that 
back their arguments with citations to avant-gardist works; or (as in 
Unger) that contain both avant-gardist and neo-Kantian passages.109 
In the end, it may be merely that some CLS writers have retained 
108. Unger, supra note 1, at 576; for examples, see id. at 602-48. 
109. For the neo-Kantian side, see Unger, supra note 1, at 576-80 (why radicals should be 
interested in developing, rather than eliminating, legal doctrine), and especially 660-62 (criticiz-
ing the "existentialist" version of modernism - Unger's term for what we have called the 
"avant-gardist" version). For the avant-gardist side, see Unger's call on CLS to thin or eliminate 
the contrast between reform and revolution, id. at 583-84, and especially his call for "an institu-
tional structure ... that would provide constant occasions to disrupt any fixed structure of power 
and coordination in social life. Any such emergent structure would be broken up before having a 
chance to shield itself from the risks of ordinary conflict." Id. at 592 (emphasis added). A vision 
of society in which any attempt to coordinate activities would be preemptively and prophylacti-
cally smashed, whether it was harmful or not, is avant-gardism with a vengeance. It is also 
incompatible with the society's continued existence. 
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avant-gardist habits of the heart despite having arrived at neo-Kantian 
belief; or the other way around. In any case, we should not be sur-
prised to find a certain amount of uncertainty and confusion between 
the two approaches: I have argued above that it is characteristic of 
modernism that even the artist is uncertain of when she has crossed 
the line from art to theater, from prophecy to quackery. In the midst 
of the staggering proliferation of CLS writing,110 superheated by an 
unusual amount of media attention, it is inevitable that CLS authors 
will continue to hurl missiles without knowing until much later where 
they have landed. 
At bottom, the contrast between avant-gardist and neo-Kantian vi-
sions of politics is the contrast between permanent revolution and 
transformation followed by reconstitution. The attraction of the for-
mer is exemplified in the attitude of Thomas Jefferson, described by 
Hannah Arendt as follows: 
His occasional, and sometimes violent, antagonism against the Constitu-
tion ... was motivated by a feeling of outrage about the injustice that 
only his generation should have it in their power "to begin the world 
over again" .... When the news of Shays' rebellion in Massachusetts 
reached him while he was in Paris, he was not in the least alarmed ... 
but greeted it with enthusiasm: "God forbid we should ever be twenty 
years without such a rebellion."11 1 
Jefferson's attitude arises from a desire to stop time at the revolution-
ary moment, the only moment in which one is truly and demonstrably 
free. 112 But the desire to stop time is really no different than the desire 
to end time, to end history - it is the messianic urge I have discussed 
previously. Let us remember, though, that history is full of false mes-
siahs. And somehow their followers have had to learn how to rebuild 
a livable world after the rainbow bridge they thought led to paradise 
had dissolved. The real task of modernist art is only in part to make 
us discontent with the past: it is also to make art. 113 
110. Kennedy and Klare's CLS bibliography, already two years out of date, has approxi· 
mately 600 entries. Kennedy & Klare, A Bibliography of Critical Legal Studies, 94 YALE L.J. 
461 (1984). 
lll. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 235-36 (1963). 
ll2. See W. BENJAMIN, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in ILLUMINATIONS 263-65 
(1968) (theses xiv-xvii). 
113. It would be possible to write a counter-essay to this one, stressing the dissimilarities 
between CLS and artistic modernism. These could be traced in part to the dissimilarities between 
law and art; and the latter are important. Without in any way attempting to diminish the human 
significance of art, we should observe that revolutions in art do not have consequences for the 
character of life in the way that revolutions in law do. Thus, a complete overthrow of traditional 
art may be disorienting and uncomfortable; a complete overthrow of traditional society could be 
accomplished only with enormous physical violence. That is why political revolutions are epi· 
sodic responses to extreme provocations. Permanent revolution in art vacillates between being 
exciting and tiresome; permanent revolution in society, such as Unger calls for in his avant· 
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gardist moments, e.g., Unger, supra note 1, at 592, might well end civilization. See note 109 
supra. These facts may explain why modernist theory is more important to the practice of art 
than CLS theory is to the practice of law; legal institutions have greater incentives to insulate 
themselves from radical theory. The message of the present essay could then be restated as 
follows: if the radical theory is neo-Kantian, so much the worse for legal institutions; if the 
radical theory is avant-gardist, so much the worse for the theory. (I would like to thank Michael 
Kelly for pressing on me the dissimilarity between CLS and artistic modernism.) 
